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                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
                       __________________ 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge 
         This appeal by a creditor arises from a district court 
judgment reversing a bankruptcy court's order disapproving a 
stipulation of settlement entered into by the Appellees and the 
trustee for the debtors that mutually released all claims between 
them relating to the sale of the debtors' home to the Appellees 
without any payment by either party. 
         The question for decision is whether the bankruptcy 
court abused its discretion by disapproving the stipulation after 
a jury verdict was entered in favor of the debtors and against 
the Appellees in a non-core proceeding in state court properly 
remanded there by the bankruptcy court.  Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 
52 F.3d 478, 487 (3d Cir. 1995) (standard of review).  The 
district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  158(a), and 
reversed the bankruptcy court.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C.  158(d), and find no abuse of discretion by the 
bankruptcy court.  We therefore will reverse the district court 
judgment. 
 
                                I. 
         This contest began with a mine-run dispute between 
parties to a real estate contract.  In the spring of 1988, John 
and Sally Martin contracted to sell their house in Green Lane, 
Pennsylvania to Jo Ann Myers and Melvin Morane (hereafter jointly 
referred to as "the Myers").  After the contract was executed, 
the Myers refused to complete the purchase of the house, 
alleging, inter alia, that the septic system was in need of 
repair.  Both parties eventually initiated actions in the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for breach of contract; the 
Martins prayed for damages, and the Myers sought specific 
performance.  In addition, the Myers filed a lis pendens against 
the Martins' property, preventing its sale and limiting its value 
as a source of loan collateral. 
         Because the Martins were relying on the real estate 
sale proceeds to service accumulated debts, this dispute caused 
them to suffer extreme economic hardship.  Indeed, on February 
12, 1992, the Martins filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition.  The Chapter 7 filing stayed the Myers' action, and the 
Martins' action became property of the estate.  Both actions 
subsequently were labeled non-core proceedings and were remanded 
to the Court of Common Pleas.   
         The series of events that followed disclose some 
tension between the debtors and the trustee for the estate, or at 
least a fundamental breakdown in communications.  The trustee 
announced to the bankruptcy judge on September 14, 1993, that she 
had reached an agreement with the Myers, resolving their dispute 
with the debtors, and providing for a mutual release of the two 
state court actions.  Assuming that there was an open-ended trial 
date for the state court action (as this had been true for 
approximately a year-and-a-half), and that delay was detrimental 
to the estate, the trustee believed that she was acting in the 
best interests of the creditors by entering into this compromise.  
The terms were memorialized in a written stipulation of 
settlement filed by the trustee and the Myers on December 17, 
1993.  On December 23, 1993, the bankruptcy court approved the 
stipulation. 
         The Martins then filed an objection to the stipulation, 
on the ground that the bankruptcy court had approved the 
stipulation in violation of Rule 9019(a), Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, which provides: 
         On motion by the trustee and after notice and 
         a hearing, the court may approve a compromise 
         or settlement.  Notice shall be given to 
         creditors, the United States trustee, the 
         debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in 
         Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the 
         court may direct. 
The bankruptcy court acknowledged that its prior approval was 
premature, and vacated the prior approval.  The bankruptcy court 
formally noticed the debtors and, on January 13, 1994, held a 
hearing on the trustee's motion to approve the stipulation.   
         At the hearing, the debtors objected to the stipulation 
because their state court action against the Myers was ready for 
trial.  Apparently, the trustee had not informed the debtors of 
her negotiations with the Myers regarding the possibility of a 
mutual release of claims.  And meanwhile, unbeknownst to the 
trustee and the bankruptcy court, the Martins had convinced the 
state court to grant an expedited trial date of January 31, 1994.  
Recognizing the potential to recover additional property for the 
estate, the trustee "did not argue in favor of its ... [m]otion" 
to approve the stipulation.  Brief of Appellees at 5.  When 
called to testify by the Myers' counsel, who argued in favor of 
the trustee's motion, the trustee's counsel stated that, although 
she [the trustee] believed the stipulation was in the best 
interest of the estate at the time she signed it, she would not 
have agreed to the stipulation had she known of the expedited 
trial date arranged by the Martins.  N.T. (1/25/94) at 3-8. 
         After hearing extensive testimony on the merits of both 
pending state court suits, the bankruptcy court engaged in a 
discussion with counsel regarding the forthcoming trial in the 
state court.  In this dialogue, the Myers' counsel indicated that 
resolution of the state trial would have no effect on the 
validity of the stipulation.  The bankruptcy court deferred 
ruling on the trustee's motion to approve the stipulation until a 
date certain, to wit, February 8, 1994. 
         Meanwhile, the Martins' state court action proceeded to 
trial on January 31, 1994, and the Martins obtained a jury 
verdict of $150,500 against the Myers.  Thereafter, on February 
8, 1994, the bankruptcy court informed the parties that the court 
was aware that the state court trial had occurred, and inquired 
as to the results.  The Myers' counsel objected to the 
introduction of the jury verdict into the record because "the 
hearing had concluded on the trustee's motion to approve the 
stipulation" and because the trustee had acted "in contravention 
of that stipulation [by] authoriz[ing] special counsel to proceed 
with the action that [s]he agreed was ended with respect to us."  
N.T. (2/8/94) at 3. 
         Faced with the potential increase of $150,500 in the 
bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy court denied the pending motion 
to approve the stipulation, explaining: 
         [T]he result's pretty obvious what I have to 
         do.  If I were going to grant that motion, 
         and I felt sure it should be granted, I would 
         have granted it.  I wouldn't have made the 
         poor Court go through a jury trial.  I mean I 
         wouldn't have wasted the taxpayers' money to 
         that extent if I had a question.  But I 
         wanted to see whether it was actually going 
         to come off, because I thought there was a 
         possibility.  It may not come off again.  And 
         then I wasn't going to piddle around anymore.  
         But it did come off, apparently.  And I had 
         no idea what the result would be, obviously, 
         although the Judge did call me beforehand 
         because he wanted to make sure that he should 
         go forward with it.  And I said, yeah, as far 
         as I know you can.  And I assumed they would, 
         and they did, obviously.  So I won't approve 
         that stipulation. 
N.T. (2/8/94) at 8.  An order denying the motion was filed the 
following day. 
         On February 18, 1994, the Myers filed a notice of 
appeal with the district court, challenging the bankruptcy 
court's order denying the trustee's motion.  The district judge 
scheduled a telephone conference with the counsel for the parties 
on May 19, 1995, after which the district court entered an order 
reversing the bankruptcy court's order and remanding the matter 
back to the bankruptcy court with instructions to approve the 
stipulation entered into between the trustee and the Myers.  The 
district court determined that the trustee had violated her duty 
of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to support her own 
motion to approve the stipulation and by authorizing the Martins 
to pursue a state court claim subsequent to entering into a valid 
settlement agreement with the Myers.  This appeal by the debtors 
followed. 
 
                               II. 
         To minimize litigation and expedite the administration 
of a bankruptcy estate, "[c]ompromises are favored in 
bankruptcy." 9 Collier on Bankruptcy  9019.03[1] (15th ed. 
1993).  Indeed, it is an unusual case in which there is not some 
litigation that is settled between the representative of the 
estate and an adverse party.  Under Bankruptcy Rule 9019, a 
bankruptcy judge has the authority to approve a compromise of a 
claim, provided that the debtor, trustee and creditors are given 
twenty days' notice of the hearing on approval of a compromise or 
settlement by the trustee.  Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(3). 
         Here, the ultimate issue on appeal is whether the 
bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it disapproved the 
compromise.  This particular process of bankruptcy court approval 
requires a bankruptcy judge to assess and balance the value of 
the claim that is being compromised against the value to the 
estate of the acceptance of the compromise proposal.  Taking our 
cue from Protective Committee Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968), we recognize four 
criteria that a bankruptcy court should consider in striking this 
balance:  (1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the 
likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the 
litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay 
necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the 
creditors.  See In re Neshaminy Office Bldg. Assocs., 62 B.R. 
798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
         Our consideration of these four factors supports the 
bankruptcy court's decision to disapprove the stipulation.  
First, when the stipulation was disapproved, the debtors' 
probability of success was 100 percent, because the verdict 
already had been obtained.  Second, the record reveals no 
expected difficulty in collection.  Third, again because the 
verdict already had been obtained, there was neither 
inconvenience nor delay.  And fourth, the interest of all 
creditors was served by collecting an additional $150,500 as 
property of the estate.  Considered together, these factors 
clearly militate in favor of the bankruptcy court's decision to 
disapprove the stipulation, and thus suggest that there was no 




                               III. 
         The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, 
however, because "the trustee did not act consistently with her 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing."  1995 WL 38952 at 
*11.  The district court reasoned that the trustee was obliged to 
honor the compromise she had struck with the Myers, and that her 
failure to do so constituted a breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing.  The district court concluded therefrom that 
the bankruptcy court should not have taken the expedited trial 
date or the outcome of the state court trial into consideration 
in deciding the motion to approve the stipulation. 
         We have no quarrel with the district court's statement 
that the trustee was required to deal with the Myers with 
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned ... and 
[to] refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." 
1995 WL 389592 at *11 (citations and quotations omitted).  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts  205 implies a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing for all contracts; the Restatement 
position has been adopted in Pennsylvania in limited situations, 
including a trustee's duty as a fiduciary to the creditors of an 
estate.  Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 
343, 354-55 (1985); Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 
5 F.3d 685, 701 (3d Cir. 1993).  Accordingly, the district court 
was correct in emphasizing the role of the trustee as a 
fiduciary. 
         However, a trustee has a fiduciary relationship with 
all creditors of the estate.  See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 354-55.  
Indeed, under the Code a trustee must investigate all sources of 
income for the estate and "collect and reduce to money the 
property of the estate."  11 U.S.C.  704(1).  She has the duty 
to maximize the value of the estate, Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 353, 
and in so doing is "bound to be vigilant and attentive in 
advancing [the estate's] interests."  In re Baird, 112 F. 960, 
960 (D.C. Cir. 1902).  In sum, "it is the trustee's duty to both 
the debtor and the creditor to realize from the estate all that 
is possible for distribution among the creditors."  4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy  704.01 (15th ed. 1993).  Thus, this trustee was 
faced with a conflict between her fiduciary duty to the creditor 
body as a whole and the alleged duty to go forward with a 
settlement agreement favoring one creditor but otherwise 
detrimental to the estate. 
         We cannot require a trustee herself to choose between 
these conflicting legal obligations.  Rather, Rule 9019(a) 
demonstrates the legislature's intent to place this 
responsibility with the bankruptcy court.  In order to make such 
a determination, the bankruptcy court must be apprised of all 
relevant information that will enable it to determine what course 
of action will be in the best interest of the estate.  
Accordingly, the trustee should inform the court and the parties 
of any changed circumstances since the entry into the stipulation 
of settlement.  The trustee may even opt not to argue in favor of 
the stipulation, as was done here, if she no longer believes the 
settlement to be in the best interest of the estate.  The trustee 
does not breach any term of the stipulation by doing so, for the 
bankruptcy court may nonetheless approve the settlement.   
          Hence, we reject the proposition that a trustee is 
required to champion a motion to approve a stipulation that is no 
longer in the best interest of the estate.  This trustee did not 
flout or breach any term of the stipulation.  Nor did she 
withdraw the motion to approve the stipulation.  Rather, at the 
hearing, the trustee simply elected not to argue in favor of her 
motion.  Thus, the very nice question before us is the proper 
conduct of a trustee in her responsibility to all creditors, the 
debtor and the court.  This appeal raises a very narrow issue, 
and we will not expand the matter beyond its perimeters.  
Accordingly, we will not constrain a bankruptcy trustee from 
fulfilling her statutory duty to the estate and the creditor body 
as a whole by preventing her from informing the court and the 
parties of changed circumstances.   
         This interpretation comports with our understanding of 
the Bankruptcy Rules and Code.  Settlement agreements frequently 
involve the disposition of assets of the estate.  The Code 
contemplates these transactions, but restricts a trustee's 
ability to use and sell such assets.  Section 363 provides: 
         The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may 
         use, sell, or lease, other than in the 
         ordinary course of business, property of the 
         estate. 
11 U.S.C.  363(b)(1) (emphasis added); see In re Roth American, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1992) (post-petition extension 
of collective bargaining agreement was outside ordinary course of 
business and was not enforceable where not approved under Section 
363).  The instant agreement compromised an asset of the debtors' 
estate.  And clearly, this act ventured beyond the domain of 
transactions that the Martins encountered in the ordinary course 
of business prior to the filing of bankruptcy, thereby 
implicating Section 363.   See In re Roth American, Inc., 975 
F.2d at 954.  The import of Section 363 is that a trustee is 
prohibited from acting unilaterally; this schema is intended to 
protect both debtors and creditors (as well as trustees) by 
subjecting a trustee's actions to complete disclosure and review 
by the creditors of the estate and by the bankruptcy court. 
         The approval process thus is integral to the proper 
functioning of a liquidation, and the court relies heavily on the 
trustee, who is entrusted to represent the creditor body.  
Indeed, under normal circumstances the court would defer to the 
trustee's judgment so long as there is a legitimate business 
justification.  In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 
1990).  If, however, a trustee is prohibited from informing the 
court of changed circumstance, or from advocating on behalf of 
creditors in light of changed circumstances, a bankruptcy court 
could proceed without full information, and the creditor body 
could suffer. 
         Accordingly, we conclude that the better course is to 
allow a trustee who fulfills her statutory duty to maximize 
assets of the estate the opportunity to report the change in 
circumstances to the court and to the creditors; such an act 
without more would not constitute a breach of contract.  What the 
trustee did here was to fulfill her obligations to all creditors, 
as required by, inter alia, 11 U.S.C.  704(1).  Although a party 
to the stipulation, the trustee was not bound to vigorously urge 
the court to accept it in light of changed circumstances that 
added $150,500 to the corpus of the bankruptcy estate.  Indeed, 
had she done so, a serious question of breach of a fiduciary 
responsibility to all creditors would have arisen.  Moreover, she 
took no affirmative steps to withdraw the motion to approve, but 
simply supplied additional information to the court, disclosing 
the state court verdict. 
         Thus we conclude that the trustee did not breach the 
settlement by allowing the Martins to proceed with the trial 
pending the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement.  While 
we recognize that some jurisdictions have concluded that a 
stipulation of settlement is binding upon the parties pending 
approval of the settlement by the bankruptcy court, see, e.g., In 
re Lyons Trans. Lines, Inc., 163 B.R. 474, 476 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1994); In re Columbus Plaza, Inc., 79 B.R. 710, 715 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1987); In re Tidewater Group, 8 B.R. 930, 933 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1981); but see In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 845 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1996) (holding bankruptcy court approval a prerequisite to 
enforceability), we think that such a rule is inapplicable to the 
unique facts of this case.   
         Here, the bankruptcy judge deferred his determination 
of whether to approve the settlement for the express purpose of 
seeing whether the trial would actually take place.  The judge 
thus essentially issued a stamp of approval to behavior on the 
part of the trustee that is violative of the settlement -- i.e., 
permitting the Martins to proceed with the trial despite the 
agreement to settle the litigation.  We conclude that where a 
bankruptcy court formally endorses a course of action pending its 
approval of a stipulation of settlement, no party who follows 
this course of action can be found to have breached the 
settlement.  We emphasize that in reaching this conclusion we do 
not decide the broader issue of whether, absent intervention of a 
bankruptcy court, parties are bound by the terms of a settlement 
pending final approval of the bankruptcy court. 
         Accordingly, we conclude that the conduct of this 
trustee did not constitute a breach of her duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.  In ruling that such a breach occurred, the 
district court erred.  The bankruptcy court's subsequent 
disapproval of the stipulation agreement was within the sound 
discretion of the bankruptcy court. 
 
                               IV. 
         We have considered all arguments advanced by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. 
         We will reverse the judgment of the district court 
reversing the bankruptcy court. 
 
 
